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Abstract
We discuss a model of heterogeneous, inductive rational agents inspired by the El
Farol Bar problem and the Minority Game. As in markets, agents interact through
a collective aggregate variable – which plays a role similar to price – whose value
is fixed by all of them. Agents follow a simple reinforcement-learning dynamics
where the reinforcement, for each of their available strategies, is related to the
payoff delivered by that strategy. We derive the exact solution of the model in the
“thermodynamic” limit of infinitely many agents using tools of statistical physics
of disordered systems. Our results show that the impact of agents on the market
price plays a key role: even though price has a weak dependence on the behavior of
each individual agent, the collective behavior crucially depends on whether agents
account for such dependence or not. Remarkably, if the adaptive behavior of agents
accounts even “infinitesimally” for this dependence they can, in a whole range of
parameters, reduce global fluctuations by a finite amount. Both global efficiency
and individual utility improve with respect to a “price taker” behavior if agents
account for their market impact.
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1 Introduction
The El Farol bar problem [1] has become a popular paradigm of complex
systems. It describes the situation where N persons have to choose whether
to go or not to a bar which is enjoyable only if it is not too crowded. In order
to choose, each person forms mental schemes, hypotheses or behavioral rules
based on her beliefs and she adopts the most successful one on the basis of past
performance. Inductive [1], low [2] or generally bounded rationality based on
learning theory [3] is regarded as a more realistic approach to the behavior of
real agents in complex strategic situations[4]. This is specially true in contexts
involving many heterogeneous agents with limited information, such as the El
Farol bar problem. Theoretical advances, beyond numerical simulations, is
technically very hard on these problems and it has been regarded as a major
step forward in the understanding of complex systems[5].
The minority game [6,7] represents a first step in this direction. It indeed de-
scribes a system of interacting agents with inductive rationality which face the
problem of finding which of two alternatives shall be chosen by the minority.
This problem is quite similar in nature to the El Farol bar problem as the
result for each agent depends on what all other agents will do and there is
no a priori best alternative. These same kind of situations arise generally in
systems of many interacting adaptive agents, such as markets[7,8].
Numerical simulations by several authors [6,8–12] have shown that the minor-
ity game (MG) displays a remarkably rich emergent collective behavior, which
has been qualitatively understood to some extent by approximate schemes
[7,13,14]. In this paper, which follows refs. [11,15], we study a generalized mi-
nority game and show that a full statistical characterization of its stationary
state can be derived analytically in the “thermodynamic” limit of infinitely
many agents. Our approach is based on tools and ideas of statistical physics
of disordered systems[16].
The minority game, as the El Farol bar problem, allows for a relatively easy
definition in words. This may be enough for setting up a computer code to run
numerical simulations, but it is clearly insufficient for an analytical approach.
Therefore we shall, in the next section, define carefully its mathematical for-
mulation. We shall only discuss briefly its motivation, for which we refer the
reader to refs. [6–8]. Even though the behavioral assumptions on which the
MG is based may be questionable when applied to financial markets (see sect.
2.4), still we find it convenient to consider and discuss the model as a toy
model for a market, in line with refs. [7,8,17]. The relation to markets, at this
level, may just be seen as a convenient language to discuss the results in simple
terms. This choice reflects our taste and surely more work needs to be done
to show the relation of the minority game with real financial markets. We be-
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lieve, however, that because of the statistical nature of the collective behavior
– which are usually quite robust with respect to microscopic changes – our
results may be qualitatively representative of generic systems of agents inter-
acting through a global quantity via a minority mechanism, such as markets.
The minority game indeed captures the essential interaction between agents
beliefs and market fluctuations – how individual beliefs, processing fluctua-
tions, produce fluctuations in their turn. This interaction is usually shortcut
in mathematical economy assuming market efficiency, i.e. that prices instanta-
neously react to and incorporate agents beliefs. The motivation underlying the
efficient market hypothesis, is, in few words that if there where inefficiencies
– or arbitrage opportunities – that would be exploited by speculators in the
market and washed out very quickly. Implicitly one is assuming that there is
an infinite number of agents in the market who are using very sophisticated
strategies which can detect, exploit and eliminate arbitrages very quickly. As
“stylized” as it may be, the minority game allows to study how a finite num-
ber of heterogeneous agents interact in a complex system such as a market.
It allows to ask to what extent this “stylized” market is inefficient and how
agents really exploit arbitrage opportunities and to what extent.
After defining the stage game, we shall briefly discuss its Nash equilibria: these
are the reference equilibria of deductive rational agents. Finally we shall pass to
the repeated game with adaptive agents which follow exponential learning. We
show that the key difference between agents playing a Nash equilibrium and
agents in the usual minority game is not that the first are deductive whereas
the latter are inductive. Rather the key issue is whether agents account for
their “market impact” or not. By market impact we refer to the fact that the
choice of each agent affects aggregate quantities, such as prices. In the minority
game [7,8] agents behave as “price takers”, i.e. as if their choices did not
affect the aggregate. However, due to the minority nature of the interaction,
the market impact reduces the “perceived” performance of strategies which
agents use in the market with respect to those which which are not used and
whose performance is monitored on the basis of a virtual trade (assuming the
same price). In order to analyze in detail this issue, we generalize the MG and
allow agents to assign an extra reward η to a strategy when it is played. This
parameter allows agents to account for their market impact and it plays the
same role as the Onsager reaction term, or cavity field, in spin glasses[16].
Our main results are:
(1) We derive a continuum time limit for the dynamics of learning.
(2) We show that this dynamics admits for a Lyapunov function, i.e. a func-
tion of all relevant dynamical variables which decreases on all trajectories
of the dynamics. This is a very important result since it turns the prob-
lem of studying the stationary state of a stochastic dynamical system
into that of characterizing the (local) minima of a function. Consider-
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ing this function as an Hamiltonian, we can apply the tools of statistical
mechanics to solve the problem.
(3) When agents do not consider their impact on the market, as in the minor-
ity game (η = 0), i) the stationary state is unique. ii) the Lyapunov func-
tion is a measure of the asymmetry of the market. In loose words, agents
minimize market’s predictability. iii)When the number of agents exceeds
a critical number the market becomes symmetric and unpredictable, with
large fluctuations as first observed in [8].
(4) If agents know what is the dependence of the aggregate variable on their
behavior they can consider their impact on the market. We refer to this as
the full information case since agents have full information on how the ag-
gregate would have changed for each of their choices. In this case, i) there
are exponentially many stationary states. ii) these states are Nash equi-
libria, iii) the Lyapunov function measures market’s fluctuations, which
means that agents cooperate optimally in maximizing global wealth when
maximizing their own utility. As a result, fluctuations always decreases
as the number of agents increase.
(5) This state is recovered when η = 1. This means that agents need not have
full information in order to reach this optimal state. It is enough that they
over-reward the strategy they are currently playing with respect to those
they are not playing, by a quantity η.
(6) Any η > 0 implies an improvement both in individual payoffs – as shown
in sect. 8 and in global efficiency with respect to the η = 0 case.
(7) The most striking result comes when asking how does the collective be-
havior interpolates between the two quite different limits when changing
η from 0 to 1. The result is that when there are few agents the change
is mild and continuous – even though there is a phase transition, that
is a continuous one (second order). When there are many agents the
change happens suddenly and discontinuously as soon as η > 0. Even
an infinitesimal η is enough to reduce market’s fluctuations by a finite
amount.
These results suggests that the neglect of market impact – which seems an
innocent approximation 1 and is usually at the very basis of mathematical
economy and finance 2 – plays a very important role in complex systems such
as markets.
1 The impact of each agent on the aggregate is of relative order 1/N and it vanishes
as N →∞.
2 For example, in determining optimal investment strategies or pricing, it is cus-
tomary to consider prices as just exogenous processes, independent of the trading
strategy really adopted.
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2 The stage game: strategic structure
2.1 Actions and payoffs
The minority game describes a situation where a large number N of agents
have to make one of two opposite actions – such as e.g. “buy” or “sell” – and
only those agents who choose the minority action are rewarded. This is similar
to the El Farol bar problem, where each one of N agents may either choose
to go or not to a bar which is enjoyable only when it is not too crowded. In
order to model this situation, let N = (1, . . . , N) be the set of agents and let
A = (−1,+1) be the set of the two possible actions. If ai ∈ A is the action of
agent i ∈ N , the payoffs to agent i is given by
ui(ai, a−i) = −aiA where A =
∑
i∈N
ai, (1)
where a−i = {aj, j 6= i} stands for opponents actions. The game rewards the
minority group. To see this, note that the total payoff to agents
∑
i ui = −A2
is always negative. Then the majority of agents, who have ai = signA, receives
a negative payoff −|A|, whereas the minority “wins” a payoff of |A|. Eq. (1)
can be generalized to ui(ai, a−i) = −ai U(A): if the function U(x) is such that
xU(x) = −xU(−x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ IR, the game again rewards the minority.
The original model[6,7] takes U(x) = sign x, but the collective behavior is
qualitatively the same [11] as that of the linear case U(x) = x on which we
focus. Note that the “inversion” symmetry ui(−ai,−a−i) = ui(ai, a−i) implies
that the two actions are a priori equivalent: there cannot be any best actions,
because otherwise everybody would do that and loose.
The key issue, clearly, is that of coordination. With respect to coordination
games [18, chapt. 6], we remark that agents cannot communicate. If commu-
nication were possible, agents would have incentives to stipulate contracts –
such as “We toss a coin, if the outcome is head I do ame = +1 and you do
ayou = −1, and if it is tail we do the other way round”. Both players would
benefit from this contract because it transforms the negative sum game into a
zero sum game for the two players. The contract would then be self-enforcing.
Agents interact only through a global or aggregate quantity A which is pro-
duced by all of them. This type of interaction is typical of market systems [7]
ant it is similar to the long-range interaction assumed in mean-field models of
statistical physics[16]. Finally note that the El Farol bar problem has a similar
structure but with A replaced by (A − A0) in Eq. (1) where A0 is related to
the bar’s comfort level [1,19].
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2.2 States and information
Nature can be in one of P states, which are labelled by a variable µ which
takes integer values µ ∈ P ≡ {1, 2, . . . , P}. We assume that P is large and
of the same order of N and we define α ≡ P/N , which we eventually keep
finite in the limit N →∞. The reason for this particular limit is because, as
first shown in ref. [8], the model’s behavior only depend on the combination
α = P/N in the large N limit. The variable µ encodes all possible information
on the state of the environment where agents live, so we shall sometimes call
µ “information”. µ is drawn from a distribution ̺µ on P, independently at
any time step. Most results will be presented for the uniform case ̺µ = 1/P .
In both the El Farol model and in the minority game, µ has a different, more
complex definition, on which we shall return later in section 9. In what follows,
we shall denote with an over-line O ≡ ∑µ∈P ̺µOµ the average of a quantity
Oµ over µ. For any µ ∈ P, payoffs are still given by Eq. (1). Strictly speaking
µ is a so called sun-spot[20] because the payoffs only depend on the actions
of agents. Now, however, the pure strategies of each agent may depend on
µ. We call AP the set of all such strategies: An element of AP is a function
a : µ ∈ P → aµ ∈ A or a P dimensional vector with coordinates aµ, ∀µ ∈ P 3 .
There are |AP | = 2P possible such functions. We call ai ∈ AP a possible pure
strategy for agent i ∈ N , with elements aµi ∈ A for all µ ∈ P. With this
notations, the payoff “matrix” reads ui(ai, a−i) = −aA where Aµ = ∑i aµi .
At this level we have just replicated the game of the previous level P times.
Again there cannot be a best strategy a ∈ AP for the same reasons as before.
2.3 Heterogeneous beliefs and strategies
Now we assume that each agent only restricts her choice on a small subset of
S elements of AP . We use the vector notation ~ai = (a1,i, . . . , aS,i) to denote
the subset of strategies available to agent i, with elements as,i ∈ AP . The
action of agent i, when the state is µ and she chooses her sth strategy shall
then be aµs,i ∈ A. We shall mainly work on the case where the strategies as,i
are randomly and independently drawn (with replacement) from AP . More
precisely
P (aµs,i = +1) = P (a
µ
s,i = −1) =
1
2
, ∀i ∈ N , s ∈ {1, . . . , S}, µ ∈ P. (2)
Note that independence of ~ai across agents is reasonable because µ is a sunspot
and no pre-play communication is possible (agents are assigned their ~ai before
the game starts).
3 We use the simple letter a without the index µ to denote the function.
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The utility of agent i, given the value of µ, his choice si and the choice of
other agents s−i = {sj , j 6= i}, now becomes
uµi (si, s−i) = −aµsi,iAµ with Aµ ≡
∑
j∈N
aµsj ,j. (3)
The goal of each agent is to maximize his expected payoff over all possible
values of µ, which, for agent i, reads
ui(si, s−i) = −asi,iA ≡ −
P∑
µ=1
̺µaµsi,iA
µ (4)
2.4 Motivation
This structure was introduced in refs. [6,7] in order to model inductive ra-
tional behavior of agents [1]. In few words the argument is the following: If
agents have not a completely detailed model of the game they are engaged in,
they may think that the value µ has some effect on the game’s outcome A,
eventually because she believes that other agents will believe the same. This
is a self-reinforcing belief because if agents behave differently for different val-
ues of µ, the aggregate outcome A will indeed depend on µ, thus confirming
agents’ beliefs. The game’s structure, however, is such that there can be no
“commonality of expectations” [1]. This means that, since there is no rational
best strategy abest – because otherwise everybody would use that and loose –
agents’ expectations (or beliefs) are forced to differ.
On the basis of her mental schemes or hypotheses on the situation she faces, an
agent may consider a particular strategy more “likely” to predict the “correct”
action than another one. More precisely, she may consider that only the S
forecasting rules ~ai = (a1,i . . . , aS,i), out of all the 2
P such rules in AP , are
“reasonable” or compatible with her beliefs and then restrict her choice to
just those. Heterogeneous beliefs are represented by the fact that each agent
draws her strategies at random, independently from others using Eq. (2).
Alternatively, one may think, following Aumann [21], that the ~ai are “rules of
thumb” that agent i evolved or learned in other contexts and which she applies
in this context. We refer the reader to refs. [1,21] for a deeper discussion of
this behavior.
It is worth to remark that, in this view, the restriction from 2P to S strategy
is voluntary. It is not difficult to argue that agents have payoff incentives to
increase the number of their strategies. In refs. [1,6,7], the state µ is known
to agents before they take a decision. So why don’t agents take a decision sµi
which depends on µ – or even an action aµi which depends on µ? The answer is
7
that they do not do so because of computational costs one is implicitly building
in the model: We are assuming that agents, in complex strategic situations,
prefer to simplify decision tasks.
While this motivation may seem reasonable for an issue such as going to a
bar or not [1], it may not be appropriate for agents in financial markets as
proposed in ref. [7].
On the other hand, this game’s structure is justified if we assume that agents
do not know the state µ before their choice. Indeed if ~aµi where known to
agent i before taking her decision, it would be reasonable for her to decide
her best action conditional on her private information ~aµi . If µ is not known
in advance, one can imagine a situation where agents resort to S “devices”
which take actions aµs,i for them. The restriction in strategy space in this case
is due to some implicit constraints or costs.
Rather then defending the behavioral assumptions of refs. [1,6,7] or pushing
further these arguments, we prefer to remain at a generic level. Indeed we be-
lieve the model displays collective phenomena which are of a generic relevance,
because of their statistical nature. Furthermore, this collective behavior is so
rich that, in our opinion, it deserves investigation by its own.
2.5 Notation: mixed strategies and averages
Before coming to the analysis of the game, let us introduce mixed strategies.
The mixed strategy πs,i, s = 1, . . . , S of each agent i is a distribution over her
available strategies: πs,i is, in other words, the probability with which agent i
plays her sth strategy. Again we use a vector notation ~πi = (π1,i, . . . , πS,i) ∈ ∆i,
where ∆i is the S dimensional simplex of i
th agent. We introduce the scalar
product ~u · ~v ≡ ∑Ss=1 us, vs for vectors ~u,~v ∈ IRS. We also define the norm
|v|2 ≡ ~v · ~v of vectors in IRS. Expectations on the mixed strategy of player i
reads E~πi(~v) = ~πi · ~v. We also define the direct product ∆N =
∏
i∈N ∆i which
we shall also call the phase space. A point (~π1, . . . , ~πN) ∈ ∆N is indeed a
possible state of the system. Finally we use the shorthand notation
〈O〉 =
S∑
s1=1
. . .
S∑
sN=1
πs1,1 · · ·πsN ,N Os1,...,sN (5)
for the expectation on the product measure of mixed strategies over the phase
space ∆N . For example we shall frequently refer to the quantity
〈Aµ〉 = ∑
i∈N
~πi · ~aµi . (6)
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3 Characterization of collective behavior
As a preliminary to a more detailed discussion, we find it useful to introduce
the key quantities which describe the collective behavior. First, as a measure
of global efficiency, we take
σ2 ≡ 〈A2〉 = ∑
µ∈P
̺µ
〈(∑
i∈N
aµsi,i
)2〉
(7)
where we remind that 〈. . .〉 means expectation over the variables si with the
corresponding mixed strategy distribution πsi,i. Note that σ
2 = −∑i〈ui〉 is
just the total loss of agents. A small value of σ2 implies an efficient coordination
among agents.
By construction, the model is symmetric in the sense that, for any µ, no partic-
ular sign of Aµ is a priori preferred. We shall see, however, that this symmetry
can be “broken” resulting in a state where Aµ may take more probably posi-
tive than negative values for some µ and vice-versa for other values of µ. As
a measure of this asymmetry, it is useful to introduce the quantity
H ≡ 〈A〉2 =
P∑
µ=1
̺µ 〈Aµ〉2 =
P∑
µ=1
̺µ
(∑
i∈N
~πi~a
µ
i
)2
. (8)
Note that H > 0 implies that there is a best strategy aµbest = −sign 〈Aµ〉 that
could ensures a positive payoff to a new-comer agent. Ideally because if the
new-comer really starts playing the game, she will also affect the outcome
Aµ. This suggests that H can be regarded as a measure of the exploitable
information content of the system by an external agent[11].
Both of these quantities are extensive, i.e. are proportional to N for N →∞,
and we shall mainly be interested in the finite quantities σ2/N and H/N . As
a statistical characterization of the equilibrium, it is useful to introduce the
self overlap
G =
1
N
∑
i∈N
|πi|2 = 1
N
∑
i∈N
S∑
s=1
π2s,i (9)
which gives a measure of the average spread of mixed strategies played by
agents. If all agents play pure strategies G = 1 whereas G = 1/S if πs,i = 1/S
∀s, i. Therefore 1/G is a measure of the “effective” number of strategies that
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agents play on average. Note that σ2 can be written as
σ2
N
=
H
N
+ 1−G− 1
N
∑
i∈N
∑
s,s′ 6=s
πs,iπs′,ias,ias′,i ∼= H
N
+ 1−G (10)
where in the last relation we neglected terms which vanish in the limit N →∞
(because as,ias′,i ∼ P−1/2 for s 6= s′). Eq. (10) means that the loss of agents
come either the asymmetry H which they produce or from the stochastic
fluctuations of their choices. Indeed if agents play pure strategies, G = 1
and the last term vanishes. Put differently, the stochastic fluctuations σ2 of
the market – or volatility – has a systematic contribution H arising from
unexploited asymmetries and a stochastic one 1 − G, which is generated by
stochastic choice of agents.
4 Nash Equilibria
Given the payoffs and the choices available to agents we now briefly discuss
Nash equilibria of the stage game. The motivation for this section is that, on
one hand Nash equilibria shall provide a reference framework for the following
discussion. On the other this discussion allows to appreciate the strategic
complexity of the problem. For our purposes, Nash equilibria are those states
which are stable under payoff incentives, given the choices available to agents.
We shall not discuss refinements. We shall remain at a quite simple level
without pretending either completeness or rigor.
Given the symmetry of the game, let us first look for symmetric Nash equilibria
at the level of actions only (i.e. P = 1) with no restriction on strategies (~ai = A
for all i ∈ N ). These cannot be in pure actions so let us look for Nash equilibria
in mixed actions: Each player either plays ai = +1 with probability πi or she
plays ai = −1 otherwise. It is easy to see that πi = 1/2 is the only symmetric
Nash equilibrium: No agent has incentives to deviate from the choice πi = 1/2
if others stick to it. This state, which we shall call the random agent state, is
usually taken as a reference state[8,13] and it is characterized by σ2 = N and
H = 0.
The game has many more Nash equilibria than the symmetric one. For example
in pure actions, any state where |A| = 1 and N odd (or |A| = 0 and N even) is
a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, focusing onN odd, agents in the minority (playing
ai = −A) would decrease her payoff, switching to the majority side. On the
other hand agents in the majority cannot increase their payoff changing from
ai = A to ai = −A because then, also the majority would change A → −A.
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The number Ω
(0)
Nash of these Nash equilibria is
Ω
(0)
Nash =
(
N
N−1
2
)
+
(
N
N+1
2
)
,
(
N
k
)
≡ N !
k!(n− k)! (11)
which is exponentially large in N . Each of these states is globally optimal,
since it has no fluctuation: σ2 = H = 1 as compared to σ2 = N , H = 0 in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
There are many more Nash equilibria at this simple level 4 . These simple con-
siderations are already enough to appreciate the complexity of the problem.
Note in particular that virtually all possible collective behavior, as parametrized
by σ2 and H is possible.
The complexity increases when P > 1 and agents have still no restriction
on strategies (~ai = AP for all i ∈ N ) Again we have the symmetric Nash
equilibrium – the random agents state – where, for any µ, each agent plays
a = +1 with probability 1/2. The number of Nash equilibria in pure actions
is huge. Indeed any combination of P pure actions Nash equilibria at the level
of actions (one for each value of µ), is a Nash equilibrium. There are therefore
Ω
(1)
Nash =
(
Ω
(0)
Nash
)P
such equilibria each of them with minimal fluctuations
σ2 = 1. Again there are many more Nash equilibria.
When the strategies of agents are restricted to the sets ~ai and S is small
(typically finite when N,P →∞), the problem of identifying Nash equilibria
becomes more complex. One way to tackle the problem is to write down the
multi-population standard replicator dynamics [22] and then identify Nash
equilibria in evolutionarily stable strategies by its stationary and stable points.
Again we make no claim of completeness: We just focus on a particular subclass
of Nash equilibria 5 – which are evolutionarily stable – which shall play a
peculiar role in the following.
The multi-population standard replicator dynamics [22] (RD) reads
dπs,i
dt
= −πs,i
∑
j∈N , j 6=i
[
as,i(~πj · ~aj)− (~πi · ~ai)(~πj · ~aj)
]
. (12)
We observe that σ2 =
∑
i,j 6=i (~πi · ~ai)(~πj · ~aj)+N is a Lyapunov function under
4 Consider e.g. to split the population N into two groups of K agents playing pure
actions and N −K playing symmetric mixed actions.
5 These are strict Nash equilibria.
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this dynamics. Indeed a little algebra leads to
dσ2
dt
= −2∑
i∈N
S∑
s=1
πs,i

(as,i − ~πi · ~ai)∑
j 6=i
~πj · ~aj


2
≤ 0. (13)
Therefore Nash equilibria are local minima of σ2 in ∆N . Furthermore, σ2 is a
linear function of πs,i for any i, s, so that
∂2σ2
∂π2
s,i
= 0, ∀s, i. Therefore σ2 is an
harmonic function in ∆N which implies that the minima are on the boundary
of ∆N . This holds for any subset of variables πi,s which therefore implies that
minima are located in the corners of the simplex, i.e. Nash equilibria are in
pure strategies (G = 1). This, in its turn, implies that Nash equilibria have
σ2 ≈ H by Eq. (10).
A detailed characterization of these Nash equilibria shall be given elsewhere
[23]. Here we briefly mention that also in this case Nash equilibria are expo-
nentially many in N . This makes the analytic calculation a step more difficult
than the one we shall present later. A simplified approximate calculation (see
appendix) gives the following lower bound 6 :
σ2
N
≥


[
1− z(S)√
α
]2
for α > z(S)2
0 for α ≤ z(S)2
(14)
where α = P/N and z(S) =
√
2/πS
∫∞
−∞dz e
−z2z[1 − erfc(z)/2]S−1 is the ex-
pected value of the maximum among S standard random variable (for S ≫ 1,
z(S) ≃ √2 lnS).
Figure 1 shows that the lower bound is already a good approximation to the
typical value of σ2 in the Nash equilibrium, specially for small values of S. Eq.
(14) implies that, for fixed S, σ2 increases with α, which is reasonable because
the complexity of information increases and the resources of agents is limited
by S. For fixed α, Eq. (14) suggests that σ2 decreases with S. So if agents
are given more resources (larger S), they attain a better equilibrium. Both of
these features are confirmed by numerical simulations (see fig. 1).
It is worth to point out that the game specified by the payoffs of Eq. (4),
for N and P very large, implies a fantastic computational complexity. De-
ductive rational agents should be able to master a chain of logical deductions
of formidable complexity in order to derive their best response. The efforts
required by this strategic situation may well exceed the bounds of memory
6 Strictly speaking, the meaning of this lower bound is that the probability to
observe σ2 smaller than the lower bound decreases exponentially with N
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Fig. 1. Global efficiency σ2/N as a function of α for S = 2, 3, and 4 from numerical
simulations with P = 128 averaged over 100 realizations of ~ai (symbols) and from
the theoretical lower bound (lines).
and computational capabilities of any realistic agent or more simply the re-
sources she is likely to devote to the problem. Furthermore her assumption
that everybody else behaves as a rational deductive player becomes more and
more unrealistic as N grows large. Finally, even with deductive rational agents
there would still be the problem of equilibrium selection which, in this case,
involves a huge number of possible equilibria.
5 Repeated game: Learning and inductive rationality
Deductive rationality, as suggested in refs. [1,6,7], is unrealistic in such complex
strategic situations 7 and it has to be replaced by inductive rationality. This
amounts to assume that agents try to learn what their best choice is from
their past performance. We henceforth focus on the repeated game in which
agents meet once and again to play the stage game of section 2.3. Different
stage games are distinguished by the time label by t ∈ IN. For example, si(t)
denotes the strategy chosen by agent i at time t and µ(t) the information
available at that time.
7 We do not discuss learning and inductive rationality in simpler cases such as e.g.
P = 1 and ~ai = A for all i ∈ N . For a discussion of reinforcement learning in El
Farol problem at this level see R. Franke (1999).
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5.1 Exponential learning:
It is generally accepted that agents follow more likely strategies which have
been more successful in the past, which is known[2,24] as the “law of effect”.
There are several behavioral models implementing the law of effect (see e.g.
[2,24]). Here we assume that agents follow an exponential learning behavior:
Each agent i assigns scores Us,i(t) to each of their strategies s = 1, . . . , S and
she plays strategy s with a probability which depends exponentially on its
score:
πs,i(t) =
eΓiUs,i(t)∑S
s′=1 e
ΓiUs′,i(t)
(15)
where Γi > 0 is a numerical constant, which may differ for each agent i ∈ N .
This model for discrete choice – called the Logit model – has a long tradition in
economics 8 [25] and some experimental support (see e.g. [26]). The MG has
been originally introduced with Γi = ∞ [6–8] and only recently it has been
generalized to Γi < ∞ [27]. Note that πs,i here is no more a mixed strategies
– which is the object of agents’ strategic choice – but rather it encodes a
particular behavioral model.
At time t = 0 scores are set to some Us,i(0), which encodes prior beliefs: e.g.
Us,i(0) > Us′,i(0) means that agent i considers strategy s a priori more likely
to be successful than s′.
At later times t > 0, agents update the scores of each of their strategies
s = 1, . . . , S in an additive way
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t) + ∆U
µ(t)
s,i [t, si(t), s−i(t)], (16)
where the reinforcement ∆U
µ(t)
s,i [t, si(t), s−i(t)] quantifies the “perceived” suc-
cess of each of their strategies s = 1, . . . , S at time t. This generally depends
both on the state µ(t) and on the strategies si(t) and s−i(t) played, at that
time by agent i and by her opponents.
8 This model is quite appealing since it satisfies the axiom of independence from
irrelevant alternatives which states that the relative odds of choices s and s′ does
not depend on whether another choice s′′ is possible or not.
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5.2 Naive and sophisticated agents
What is the perceived success ∆Us,i of a strategy s? The most natural way to
quantify the success of a strategy is by the payoff it delivers to the agent if
played. This suggests 9 that ∆Uµs,i = u
µ
i [s, s−i]/P or
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t) + u
µ(t)
i [s, s−i(t)]/P. (17)
By this equation, however, one assumes that agent i knows what payoff she
would have got if she had played any strategy s, including those s 6= si(t)
which were not used. In other words, agents must have full information on the
effects (payoffs) of all of their strategies. Furthermore agents take into account
the way in which the aggregate quantity Aµ(t) would have changed if they had
played strategy s 6= si(t). Agents following Eq. (17) are able of sophisticated
counter-factual thinking, and are henceforth called sophisticated agents 10 . It is
worth observing that the score, with the dynamics (17), acquires the meaning
of cumulated payoff: Us,i(t) is indeed the payoff agent i would have received
(divided by P ) if she had always played strategy s against her opponents
strategies s−i(t′) for all t′ < t.
In the minority game 11 agents are naive [4]: i) they eventually have partial
information, which means that they only know the payoff delivered by the
strategy si(t) which they actually played. ii) they behave as if they were
playing against an exogenous signal Aµ(t), rather than N − 1 other agents.
Naive agents neglect their impact on the aggregate Aµ and update scores as
if Aµ had not changed if they had used a different strategy. More precisely
∆U
µ(t)
s,i [t, si(t), s−i(t)] = −aµ(t)s,i Aµ(t)(t)/P. (18)
Note that Eq. (17) does not depend on the strategy si(t) which agent i used,
whereas Eq. (18) depends on it because Aµ(t)(t) contains the action a
µ(t)
si(t),i
which agent i actually played. Regarding the MG as a toy market, if the
aggregate Aµ(t)(t) plays the role of price, Eq. (18) implies that agents behave
as “price takers”: They behave as if price did not depend on their actions. By so
doing, they simplify considerably the strategic complexity of the context they
face. Eq. (18) may be a closer approximation than Eq. (17) to the behavior of
real agents in complex strategic situations.
9 The factor 1/P is introduced here and in the following equations for convenience.
The reason will become clear in the next section.
10 This term, as opposed to naive, is borrowed from ref. [4].
11 and probably also in the El Farol problem, ref. [1] is not very clear on this point.
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One would naively expect that when N → ∞ the difference between Eqs.
(17) and (18) is negligible. Indeed the relative impact of an agent on Aµ is
negligible in that limit. Surprisingly we shall see that this is not so and a
system of naive agents behave quite differently from sophisticated agents with
full information. In order to study the effect of the impact of agent’s choice
on the aggregate, we generalize Eq. (18) including a term +ηδs,si(t)/P . The
dynamics of scores then reads
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t)− aµ(t)s,i Aµ(t)(t)/P + ηδs,si(t)/P. (19)
The last term, which is absent (η = 0) in the original definition of the MG,
models the tendency of agents to stick to the strategy they are currently using.
Indeed η > 0 implies that agents reward the strategy they use s = si(t) with
respect to those they are not currently using s 6= si(t). By doing this, agents
approximately account for the impact of their actions on the global variable
Aµ(t)(t). As we shall see, this term has very deep consequences.
We shall consider these two cases – of partial information with naive agents
and of full information – separately below, and see that the collective behavior
is remarkably different. Before doing that, we shall first discuss the dynamics
of scores in the long run.
6 Continuum time limit and the dynamics in the long run
In this section, we shall first derive a continuum time dynamics for Eq. (16)
which captures the long run behavior of the system. Then we shall show that
the collective behavior of agents, within this continuum time dynamics, admits
a Lyapunov function, i.e. a functions which is minimized along the trajecto-
ries of the dynamics of the system. The dynamics therefore converges to the
minima of this function. This is a quite important step, since it allows to
turn the study of the stationary state of the dynamical model into the study
of the local minima of the Lyapunov function. Therefore one can regard the
Lyapunov function as the Hamiltonian of a system and resort to the powerful
tools of statistical mechanics in order to study the statistical properties of its
ground state (global minimum) and eventually of its meta-stable states (local
minima). This shall be the subject of the next section.
In order to study the stationary state properties of the system, we need to
consider the long time limit of the dynamics of scores, Eq. (16). The key
observation, in this respect, is that we expect that Us,i(t) changes significantly
and systematically only over time-scales of order ∆t ∼ P . Indeed the score
of strategies depend on their performance on all the P states µ. In order to
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capture the long time dynamics of scores, let us set
Us,i(t) = U˜s,i(τ), with τ =
t
P
. (20)
The dynamics in continuum time of U˜s,i is obtained iterating Eq. (16) for
∆t = Pdτ time steps:
U˜s,i(τ + dτ)− U˜s,i(τ)
dτ
=
1
P dτ
P (τ+dτ)−1∑
t=Pτ
∆U
µ(t)
s,i [t, si(t), s−i(t)] (21)
We can now take the thermodynamic limit N,P → ∞ keeping dτ finite. By
the law of large numbers, the right hand side converges almost surely to its
average value (see later). Here ∆U
µ(t)
s,i is a function of the random variables
µ(t) and {sj(t), j ∈ N} which are chosen independently at each time step.
If the stochastic fluctuations in U˜s,i are small (see later) also the distribution
πs,i(t) will be well behaved in the limit P → ∞, specially if Γi is small 12 .
Indeed defining π˜s,i(τ) = πs,i(t = Pτ), Eq. (15) becomes
π˜s,i(τ) =
eΓiU˜s,i(τ)∑S
s′=1 e
ΓiU˜s′,i(τ)
(22)
which remains meaningful in the limit P → ∞. Equivalently we may say
that the distribution ~πi remains approximately constant over Pdτ time steps.
Taking the continuum time limit dτ → 0 in Eq. (21), we find
dU˜s,i
dτ
= 〈∆Us,i〉 (23)
where averages are taken with respect to the distributions ~πj of strategies and
ρµ of µ.
It is worth to point out that the order of the two limits – first P → ∞
and then dτ → 0 – is quite important. Indeed the infinitesimal time interval
dτ corresponds to a very large number Pdτ of time steps, which eventually
diverges. This implies that the characteristic time of the system is proportional
to P time steps 13 .
12 Interestingly, numerical simulations show that the continuum time approximation
works generally also in the limit Γi →∞.
13 In other words, P repetition of the game is the analogous of a “sweep” of the
system in a Montecarlo simulation.
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The validity of the law of large number can be verified studying the fluc-
tuations of ∆U
µ(t′)
s,i around its average 〈∆Us,i〉. By routine use of Tchebicev
inequality, it is enough to show that
2
(Pdτ)2
P (τ+dτ)−1∑
t,t′=Pτ
〈(
∆U
µ(t)
s,i − 〈∆Us,i〉
) (
∆U
µ(t′)
s,i − 〈∆Us,i〉
)〉
µ,{sj}
(24)
vanishes when N,P →∞. This is indeed the case because the ∆Uµ(t)s,i depends
on the random variables µ(t) and {sj(t), j ∈ N}, which are drawn indepen-
dently at each t from their distributions ρµ and {~πj, j ∈ N} respectively.
Only the terms with t = t′ or µ(t) = µ(t′) contribute to the average, whereas
all other terms vanish because the average factorizes. Only a fraction ∼ 1/P
of the terms is non-vanishing, which implies that the expression (24) is indeed
of order 1/P and it vanishes as claimed.
We shall henceforth work with continuum time and drop the tilde over U and
π, in order to simplify notations. Combining Eqs. (15) and (23), and with a
little algebra, one finds that πs,i satisfies the equation
dπs,i
dτ
= γiπs,i

dUs,i
dτ
− ~πi · d
~Ui
dτ

 = Γiπs,i
[
〈∆Us,i〉 − ~πi ·
〈
~∆U i
〉]
. (25)
6.1 Lyapunov function for naive agents
The dynamics (19) of naive agents in continuum time is easily derived com-
bining Eqs.(19,25) and a little algebra. It reads
dπs,i
dτ
= −Γiπs,i


∑
j∈N
[
as,i〈aj〉 − 〈ai〉〈aj〉
]
− η(πs,i − |πi|2)

 (26)
with the shorthand 〈aµj 〉 = ~πj · ~aµj . This is different from RD (Eq. 12). So ~πi
does not converge, in general, to a Nash equilibrium. Rather one can show
that
Hη = H − η
∑
i∈N
|πi|2 (27)
is a Lyapunov function of this dynamics. Indeed, observing that
∂Hη
∂πs,i
= −2dUs,i
dτ
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and using Eq. (25), one finds that
dHη
dτ
=
∑
i∈N
∂Hη
∂~πi
· d~πi
dτ
= −2∑
i∈N
Γi
S∑
s=1
πs,i

dUs,i
dτ
− ~πi · d
~Ui
dτ


2
< 0. (28)
The dynamics converges therefore to the minima of Hη.
This equation implies that in the stationary state (dHη/dτ = 0) each of the
strategies played by agent i – those with πs,i > 0 – has the same perceived
success
dUs,i
dτ
in the long run. Note also that for η = 1, by Eq. (10),H1 ≃ σ2−N
which implies that for η = 1 the stationary state is close to a Nash equilibrium.
We shall come back to the statistical characterization of the stationary state
for naive agents in the next section. It is worth to stress, at this point that
this result holds for any realization of aµs,i. It actually holds for much more
general models [28].
6.2 Agents with full information
It is known [24] that exponential learning with full information, for a single
agent playing against a stationary stochastic process, converges to rational
expectations. If we can regard the opponents of i as a stationary process, this
implies that ith strategy converges to the best response. If this happens for
all players the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. This is indeed what
numerical experiments show (see figure 1).
We can recover this result within the continuum time limit. Indeed, after some
algebra one finds that Eq. (25) becomes, in this case
dπs,i
dτ
= −Γiπs,i
∑
j∈N , j 6=i
[
as,i〈aj〉 − 〈ai〉〈aj〉
]
. (29)
Apart from the factor Γi, this coincides with the RD of Eq. (12). Again σ
2
is minimized along the trajectories of Eq. (29): it is easy to check that the
time derivative of σ2 is given by Eq. (13) with an extra factor Γi inside the
sum on i ∈ N . We therefore conclude that with exponential learning and full
information agents coordinate on a Nash equilibrium. Each agent plays, in the
long run a pure strategy, i.e. G = 1. The Nash equilibrium to which agents
converge depends on the initial conditions Us,i(0), i.e. on prior beliefs: Different
initial conditions select different Nash equilibria.
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7 Statistical mechanics of naive agents
As we have shown, the stationary state of the system is described by the
ground state of the Hamiltonian Hη. This can be analyzed using the tools of
statistical physics and in particular, the replica method which allows us to
deal with quenched disorder (i.e. agents’ heterogeneity). The details of the
calculation are described in the appendix in some detail. Here we shall just
describe the results. We shall consider separately the results for η = 0, i.e.
for the original MG, for which we can derive exact results within a relatively
simple calculation. The case η > 0 requires more complex calculations which
shall be the subject of a forthcoming paper [23]. Here, the qualitative under-
standing for η > 0 provided by the present approach will be supplemented by
numerical simulations.
7.1 η = 0: The minority game
It is easy to see that for η = 0, the Hamiltonian H0 ≡ H is a non-negative
quadratic form of the variables πs,i and therefore it attains its minimum on
a connected subset M ∈ ∆N 14 . We therefore conclude that the long run
dynamics of this system is described by the minimum of H . Loosely speaking,
in view of our definition of H , we may say that naive agents, in the minority
game, minimize the “information content” of the market output Aµ(t)(t).
A complete statistical characterization of the minima ofH in the limit N →∞
with P/N = α finite and ̺µ = 1/P , can be obtained from the replica method
a tool of statistical mechanics devised to deal with disordered systems. An
account of this method is given in the appendix together with technical details
on the calculation. Here we only discuss the results and their interpretation,
We distinguish two regimes separated by a phase transition which occurs as
α→ αc(S) ∼= S/2− 0.6626 . . ..
7.1.1 Asymmetric phase: α > αc
For α > αc we find an asymmetric phase. Indeed H > 0 which means that
〈Aµ〉 6= 0 at least for some µ ∈ P. The symmetry between the two actions in A
is broken and a best strategy aµbest = −sign 〈Aµ〉 arises in AP . An N+1st agent
who joined the game with this strategy would receive a payoff |A| − a2best =
14 Note that, on the contrary, σ2 is not positive definite and it attains its minima,
the Nash equilibria, on a non-connected subset of ∆N .
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|A| − 1 15 .
The set M where H attains its minimum consists of a single point, so that,
for any initial conditions, the dynamics converges to the same final state in
the long run. In other words prior beliefs of agents about their strategies are
irrelevant in the long run.
The asymmetry H decreases with decreasing α, which means increasing the
number N of agents at fixed P . Naively speaking the asymmetry in 〈Aµ〉
is exploited by the adaptive behavior of agents who then reduce it. Indeed
agents are more and more selective in their choice, as shown by the fact that
G increases as α decreases and the effective number of strategies used 1/G
decreases. At the same time, as α decreases, the equilibrium becomes more
and more “fragile” in the sense that its susceptibility to a generic perturbation
increases (see the Appendix and ref. [16]).
7.1.2 Phase transition and symmetric phase: α < αc
As α→ αc the asymmetry vanishes H → 0 and the response of the system to a
generic perturbation diverges. This signals a phase transition to the symmetric
phase α < αc where H = 0 and any perturbation can change dramatically the
equilibrium. The setM whereH attains its minimum is no more a single point,
but rather an hyper-plane of a dimension which increases as α decreases. Any
point in M is an equilibrium of Eq. (26) and any displacement along this
set can occur freely. In particular, with different initial conditions, the system
reaches different points of M. The dynamics (26) indeed converges to the
“closest” point on M which is on its trajectory. In other words, prior beliefs
Us,i(0) are relevant for α < αc: With different Us,i(0) the system reaches
different equilibria.
7.1.3 Anti-persistence in the symmetric phase
For α < αc the system is dynamically degenerate: any displacement on the set
M can occur freely. In particular stochastic fluctuations can induce a motion
in M. This is what happens for Γi ≫ 1 where numerical simulations show
the presence of “crowd effects” [8,13,14]. This effect manifests in an increases
of σ2/N as α decreases, which is much faster than what predicted by our
theory (see full symbols in fig. 2). This behavior can be traced back to a
dynamical anti-persistence [11] resulting from the fact that agents, neglecting
their impact on A(t), over-estimate the performance of the strategies they do
15 The term −a2best is the “market” impact caused by the new agents. It arises
because if the strategy aµbest where actually played by the N +1
th agent, that would
also modify Aµ → Aµ + aµbest. Ref. [17] discusses in greater detail these issues.
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Fig. 2. Global efficiency σ2/N as a function of α for S = 2, 3, 4 and 5 from numerical
simulations of the minority game with N = 101 agents and Γi = ∞ (averages
were taken after 100P time steps), averaged over 100 realizations of ~ai (small full
symbols), from numerical minimization of H (large open symbols) and from the
theoretical calculation (lines) with Us,i(0) = 0.
not play and they keep switching from one to the other. Each time a particular
state µ shows up, agents tend to do the opposite action of what they did the
last time they saw the same state µ. Therefore the period of this dynamics is
of 2P time steps 16 [11].
The analytic approach to this effects requires the study of the dynamical
solutions of Eq. (19), which go beyond the aims of the present work. We suspect
that one should refine our continuum time approach, including eventually the
second order time derivative and the effects of fluctuations to some extent.
Indeed a periodic motion is usually related to the inertial term (d2U/dτ 2) of
the dynamic equation.
The periodic behavior persists as long as 1/Γi is much smaller than the am-
plitude of the oscillations of Us,i(t). As Γi decreases, Eq. (15) finally smoothes
the oscillations in agents choices and the anti-persistent behavior disappears,
as indeed observed in [27].
16 The fact that agents do not realize that they have an impact on the aggregate
in this case is probably unrealistic. From their point of view, the same strategy
which had a good score of performance when they were not using it, starts perform-
ing badly as soon as they use it. This could either be considered a manifestation
of Murphy’s law or the fact that agents rationality is bounded below the level of
common sense.
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7.1.4 Global efficiency and Tragedy of Commons
As far as global efficiency is concerned, we find that σ2/N increases with α
towards the random agent limit as 1 − σ2/N ∼ 1/α. This is shown in figure
2, which also shows that numerical simulations for finite populations fully
confirm our theoretical results. For fixed α, as S increases σ2/N first decreases
moderately as long as α > αc(S). Then the system enters the symmetric
phase (α < αc) because αc(S) increases, and σ
2/N increases with S towards
the random agent limit as 1 − σ2/N ∼ 1/S. We then conclude that allowing
agents to have more strategies does not increase global efficiency as in the
Nash equilibrium. Rather it pushes the system in the symmetric phase where
σ2 converges to the random agent limit as S →∞.
As long as the system is in the asymmetric phase, agents have incentives to
consider more than S strategies, because that allows them to detect better the
asymmetry. However if every agent enlarges the set of strategies she considers,
i.e. if S increases, the system enters in the symmetric phase. Then global
efficiency starts to decline. This behavior is reminiscent of the Tragedy of the
Commons [30]: a situation where individual utility maximization by all agents
leads to over-exploitation of common resources and poor payoffs.
7.2 Rewarding the played strategy: η > 0
We expect that with η = 1 agents behave almost optimally, in the sense that
they converge to a stationary state which is close to a Nash equilibrium. Given
the difference in the collective behavior of agents in the two cases – which may
be appreciated comparing figure 2 for η = 0 with figure 1 for η = 1 – it is
natural to ask what happens when η changes continuously from 0 to 1.
Figure 3 shows the analytical prediction for the dependence on η of σ2/N
for S = 2. These are based on the replica symmetric ansatz which is only
valid for α > αRSB(η), where αRSB(η) marks a replica symmetry breaking
phase transition, which will be discussed elsewhere in detail[23]. Here we just
mention that αRSB(η) = 0 for η < 0, αRSB(0) = αc and αRSB(η) ≥ 1− 1/√πα
(for S = 2 and) η > 0. For α < αRSB(η) the analytical results derived in the
appendix provides an approximate description of the behavior of the system
which is however sufficient to appreciate the relevant features.
The most striking consequence of the result in fig. 3 is that the behavior
of σ2/N is quite different for α > αc and for α < αc. Indeed for large α,
σ2/N changes continuously with η whereas σ2/N drops discontinuously to
zero as η → 0 for small α. This feature is reproduced in figure 4 for two
characteristic values of α also shown as arrows in fig. 3. We show both the
behavior derived from the numerical minimization of Hη and the behavior
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Fig. 3. Theoretical estimate of global efficiency σ2/N as a function of α for S = 2
and several values of η within the replica symmetric ansatz.
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P=64, N=101: minority game
            minimization of H
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Fig. 4. σ2/N as a function of η for S = 2 and α ≃ 0.079 < αc ≃ 0.3374 and
α ≃ 0.63 > αc. Results both of numerical simulations of the minority game and of
the numerical minimization of Hη are shown.
of the modified minority game with rewarding. Numerical results agree quite
well in an intermediate range of values of η whereas for η > 0.5 or η < −0.2
some discrepancy – which we believe is due to finite size effects – is found.
This effect can be even more spectacular when anti-persistence effects occur.
Indeed the jump of σ2/N at η = 0 can be of several orders of magnitude!
The origin of this behavior lies in the dynamic degeneracy of the system for
α < αc and η = 0. Even an infinitesimal change in η can dramatically alter
the nature of the minima of Hη: for negative η there is only one minimum
which becomes shallower and shallower as η → 0−. At η = 0 the minimum is
always unique but it is no more point-like. Rather it is a connected setM. An
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infinitesimal positive value of η is enough to lift this degeneracy and select only
some extreme points of M as the minima of Hη. The set of minima becomes
suddenly disconnected. At fixed α < αc, varying η across the transition Hη
changes continuously – with a discontinuity in its first derivative – whereas G
and hence σ2/N change discontinuously with a jump.
The potential implications of this result are quite striking: rewarding the strat-
egy played more than those which have not been played by a small amount is
always advantageous, both individually (see below) and globally. In particular,
an infinitesimal reward is sufficient to avoid crowd effects when α is small and
to reduce the fluctuations by a finite amount.
8 From the agent’s viewpoint
Let us consider the behavior of agents in some detail (see also ref. [17] for a
related discussion). Our goal is to show that individual payoffs increase when
η increases in [0, 1]. This means that rewarding the strategy “in vivo”, that
which has actually been played, is convenient for each agent. We focus on one
agent, say i, and assume that others play strategies s−i(t) according to some
stationary probability distribution ~π−i. If µ(t) is drawn randomly from ρµ we
can consider A
µ(t)
−i (t) =
∑
j 6=i a
µ
sj(t),j
(t) as a stationary process. Since we deal
with one agent, we shall drop the subscript i in this section. Also we first focus
on the case η < 1 and only after discuss the case η > 1. In the long run the
perceived performance of strategy s is
〈∆Us〉=−as 〈A−i〉 − ~π · ~aas + ηπs
∼=−as 〈A−i〉 − (1− η)πs (30)
where the approximation in Eq. (30) holds for P ≫ 1 since as′as ∼ 1/
√
P for
s′ 6= s. Because of Eq. (25), strategies can either i) have πs > 0 and 〈∆Us〉 = v
independent of s or ii) have πs = 0 and 〈∆Us〉 < v. This can be understood
by a rather simple argument: Imagine that strategy 1 has 〈∆U1〉 > v. Then
by the very learning dynamics, the agent shall use strategy 1 more frequently
than others and hence π1 shall increase. Because of the last term in Eq. (30)
that will decrease the perceived performance 〈∆U1〉 of that strategy. On the
other hand, if 〈∆U1〉 < v the agent shall use it less frequently, hence its 〈∆U1〉
shall increase. If 〈∆U1〉 < v even when π1 → 0 then the agents will never play
that strategy, i.e. π1 = 0.
Let n ≤ S be the number of strategies with πs > 0 and let these be labeled
by s = 1, . . . , n, whereas πk = 0 for k > n. Taking the sum of Eq. (30) on
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s = 1, . . . , n we find
v = −1
n
n∑
s=1
as 〈A−i〉 − 1− η
n
where n is fixed by the condition v > −ak 〈A−i〉 for all k > n. Clearly
−as 〈A−i〉 > v > −ak 〈A−i〉 for any s ≤ n and k > n hence the n strategies
which the agent uses are the n more efficient ones. Then Eq. (30) becomes
πs =
1
n
+
1
1− η
(
1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′ 〈A−i〉 − as 〈A−i〉
)
.
Note that strategies with a larger −as 〈A−i〉 are played more frequently. The
average payoff u = −~π · ~a 〈A−i〉 − 1 delivered by a learning behavior with
parameter η is
u = −1
n
n∑
s=1
as 〈A−i〉+ 1
1− η
n∑
s=1
(
as 〈A−i〉 − 1
n
n∑
s′=1
as′ 〈A−i〉
)2
− 1 (31)
which is an increasing function of η for η < 1. Indeed at fixed n, this is trivially
true. With some more algebra, it is easy to check that n is a non-increasing
function of η and that u increases as n decreases. This means that for η < 1
average payoffs are non-decreasing functions of η as claimed.
When η → 1 the only possible solution is that with n = 1 which means that
the agent plays her best response to A−i. For η > 1 the agent over-weights
the performance of her strategies. As a result she sticks to only one of her
strategies, i.e. n = 1, but that need not be her best one. Without entering in
too many details, let us only mention that for η > 1 the agent plays always
one strategy which is dynamically selected by initial conditions and stochastic
fluctuations.
9 Exogenous vs endogenous information
In the El Farol problem and in the MG the state µ(t) is determined by the
outcome of past games. In other words µ(t) is an endogenous information
which encodes information on the game itself: Agents record which has been
the winning action in the last M = log2 P games and store this information
in the binary representation of the integer µ. This means that µ is updated at
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each time as:
µ(t+ 1) = mod
(
2µ(t) +
1 + signA(t)
2
, P
)
, A(t) =
∑
i∈N
a
µ(t)
si(t),i
, (32)
Note that A(t) depends on time both through µ(t) and through the choice
si(t) of each agent i ∈ N at time t. Eq. (32) implies that the dynamics of µ(t)
is defined by the collective behavior of the game itself. Still payoffs do not
depend on µ(t) which is a sun-spot. However agents can coordinate in such
a way that some state µ – i.e. some pattern in the time series of A(t) – can
occur more frequently than some other and eventually some can never occur.
As far as the collective behavior in the stationary state is concerned, the only
relevant information of this dynamics is the stationary state distribution ̺µ
of the process Eq. (32). In the long run, the distribution ̺µ is determined
by the collective behavior of agents through A(t). Technically, the problem of
computing ̺µ is related to the diffusion of a particle on the directed graph
defined by Eq. (32), where each note µ ∈ P has two outgoing links to nodes
mod(2µ, P ) + 1 and mod(2µ+ 1, P ) + 1 (and two incoming links). Stochastic
processes on this graph, known as De Bruijn graph, are called shift register
sequences [31] in computer science.
This differs from the setting we have discussed so far, in which µ(t) is in-
dependently drawn at each time t with ̺µ = 1/P . We may call µ exogenous
information in this case since it can be considered to encode information about
an external system, eventually the environment where agents live. This ver-
sion of the MG has been first introduced by Cavagna [10]. He found that
in numerical simulations the collective behavior with exogenous information
differs only weakly from that under endogenous information. Having already
discussed the results for the exogenous case, let us now consider how these
change under endogenous information.
9.1 Naive agents with η ≤ 0 and endogenous information
With endogenous information the system behaves qualitatively in the same
way, as first observed in ref. [10] by numerical simulations for η = 0. This
is because the stationary state distribution ̺µ of the process µ(t) – which is
induced by the dynamics of agents through Eq. (32) – is almost uniform on
P. Actually ̺µ = 1/P for α ≤ αc because of the symmetry of Aµ.
In order to measure the deviation of ̺µ from the uniform distribution ̺µunif =
1/P , we compute the entropy Σ(P ) = −∑µ∈P ̺µ logP ̺µ. With the choice
of base P for the logarithm Σ(P ) = 1 for ̺µ = 1/P so that 1 − Σ(P ) is
a reasonable measure of the deviation of ̺µ from a uniform distribution. In
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Fig. 5. Deviation of the distribution ̺µ from the uniform one from numerical simu-
lations with η = 0.
figure 5, 1− Σ(P ) is plotted for several values of P as a function of α. While
for α < αc we find Σ(P ) = 1 to a great accuracy, for α > αc numerical results
suggest that Σ(P ) → 1 as P = αN → ∞. On this basis, we conclude as in
ref. [10], that the MG with endogenous information gives the same results as
the MG with exogenous information. By a detailed study of the dynamics of
the process µ(t) one can actually give a deeper theoretical foundation to this
conclusion and derive analytically this result [32]. We conjecture that, as long
as agents choice remains stochastic (G < 1), as for η ≤ 0, the dynamics in µ(t)
is ergodic in P. Note indeed that, for any µ, A(t) has stochastic fluctuations
around its average value 〈Aµ〉 which are of the same order of magnitude of the
average itself.
9.2 η > 0 and agents with full endogenous information
A qualitatively different situation arises when η > 0 and in particular when
agents have full information. We shall mainly discuss the latter case which
corresponds to η = 1 and then discuss briefly the generic η > 0 case. The
key observation is that agents for η = 1 play pure strategies (G = 1). This
means that agents behave the same whenever µ(t) = µ and accordingly A(t)
shall always take the same value Aµ each time µ(t) = µ. This implies that the
dynamics of Eq. (32) for µ(t) becomes deterministic. More precisely it locks
into a periodic orbit µ(t + T ) = µ(t) with some period T . Only the values
of µ into this orbit shall occur in the long run, whereas all other values of µ
shall never occur. This means that agents strongly influence the time series
of µ(t) and hence of the aggregate A(t). Most remarkably, in doing so, they
achieve a much better coordination with respect to the exogenous information
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case because they reduce the parameter α = P/N to α˜ = T/N 17 . Numerical
studies show that T ∝ √P so that, in the limit N →∞ with P/N = α finite,
α˜ ∝ 1/√N and also σ2/N takes a very small value 18 .
The same behavior shall be expected for all η > 0 such that G = 1. Therefore
we expect that for each α there shall be a particular value ηEB(α) beyond
which ergodicity of the dynamics of µ(t) in P breaks down. For values of
η > ηEB(α) we expect the dynamics of µ to lock into periodic orbits causing
a reduction of σ2 similar to that discussed above.
10 Discussion
There is a growing literature on learning which addresses the issue of which
learning procedure (modeling inductive rationality) may eventually lead to
deductive rational outcomes[3,24]. The choice made in the El Farol bar prob-
lem and in the MG – which is exponential learning (Eq. 15) eventually with
Γi →∞ – is one of these as we have shown. What leads to equilibria different
from Nash equilibria is the fact that agents i) have not full information on the
effects of their strategies and ii) that they neglect or do not account properly
for their impact on the aggregate in the evaluation of their strategies.
In particular, for η = 0, this new equilibrium, which we call naive agents equi-
librium (NAE) differs substantially from a Nash equilibrium (NE), because:
(1) In a NE global efficiency always increases as the number N of agents
increases (with P fixed), whereas in the NAE it only decreases as far
as N < P/αc and then it increases in a way which depends on initial
conditions (prior beliefs) and on the parameters Γi.
(2) There are (exponentially) many disconnected Nash equilibria which are
selected by initial conditions, i.e. by prior beliefs. For α > αc there is a
unique NAE and, for all initial conditions, the system converges to it. For
α < αc there is a continuum of NAE, but they are all connected.
(3) Global efficiency (σ2), for fixed α, always decreases as agents resources (S)
increase, and it eventually converges to perfect optimization for S →∞.
In the NAE efficiency only mildly improves with S in the asymmetric
phase. But increasing S also increases αc(S) and when αc(S) > α the
system enters into the symmetric phase where σ2 increases with S towards
17 Note that the values of µ which occur in the long run are sampled uniformly.
18 The result T ∝ √P is what one would obtain on a random directed graph with P
vertex each with two outgoing links. This is a reasonable approximation because the
dynamics locks into periodic loops of T ∝ √P vertices where the peculiar structure
of De Bruijn graphs (see Eq. (32)) does not play a significant role.
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the random agent limit (this occurs for Γi small [27]).
(4) In the NE agents play pure strategies, i.e. ~πi is a singleton ∀i ∈ N .
Indeed, for fixed opponent strategies s−i, each agent typically 19 has a
pure strategy si – the best response – which is superior to others. In
the NAE, agents mix this strategy with others because, neglecting their
impact on A(t), they over-estimate the performance of the strategies they
do not play. Playing a pure strategy reduces its perceived performance
and this is why agents mix strategies in the NAE (see also ref. [17]). The
probability πs,i in the NAE is such that the perceived performance of all
strategies which are played (πs,i > 0) is the same.
(5) A consequence of the previous point is that, the origin of information
is quite important for inductive agents with full information, while it is
irrelevant in the NAE [10]. Inductive agents with full information lead,
under endogenous information, to a deterministic dynamics of µ(t) and
only a small subset of informations µ is ever visited. This in turn leads to
a much more efficient coordination. Naive agents with endogenous infor-
mation, on the other hand, induce a dynamics on µ(t) which is “ergodic”,
i.e. which visits each information µ with nearly the same frequency ̺µ.
Therefore the collective behavior is the same as that of the NAE with
exogenous information.
For intermediate values of η the collective behavior of agents interpolates be-
tween these two situations in a continuous way for α > αc or in a discontinuous
way for α < αc.
We expect that rewarding the strategy which is played with respect to those
which are not played should be advantageous both individually and globally in
more general situations where agents interact through a global variable via a
minority-like mechanism. Indeed one can show that the qualitative picture we
have described remains the same if we allow for heterogeneity of various sorts
such as allowing for a dependence on i of S and η, or changing the distribution
in Eq. (2) to a generic Pi(a) for a ∈ IR [28] (see the appendix).
Our results clearly allow for several extensions, as those of ref. [17]. It also
suggests a theoretical approach to the El Farol problem [1] 20 . We expect
19 Typically here means that we disregard unlikely realizations where two pure
strategies happen to yield the same payoffs.
20 The key problem lies in the parametrization of forecasting rules: agents in the
El Farol problem consider the record of past attendance to the bar – i.e. A(t′) for
t′ < t – whereas in the minority game agents only consider the record of the sign
of A(t′). Focusing on the last M games, there can be NM possible records in the
El Farol problem, instead of 2M . This causes no problem in principle since one
can take P = NM . In practice however forecasting rules have to be “reasonable”:
For example a randomly drawn rule can easily predict a different outcome if the
attendance of one of the past weeks just changes by one unit. Some sort of continuity
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that the distinction between inductive agents with full information and naive
agents to be of key importance also in the El Farol problem and we believe
that, eventually, an analytical solution in the limit N → ∞ is possible along
the same lines followed here.
A Appendix: Replica calculation for the MG
Our goal is to compute and characterize the minimum of Hη = 〈A〉2 − ηNG,
with G given by Eq. (9), in ∆N = {~πi, i ∈ N}. Considering Hη as an Hamil-
tonian of a statistical mechanic’s system, this can be done analyzing the zero
temperature limit. First we build the partition function
Z(β) = Trπe
−βHη{π}, (A.1)
where β is the inverse temperature and Trπ stands for an integral on ∆
N (we
call simply π an element of ∆N ). The quantity of interest is then
min
π∈∆N
Hη{π} = − lim
β→∞
β−1 lnZ(β). (A.2)
This in principle depends on the specific realization aµs,i of rules chosen by
agents. In practice however, to leading order in N , all realizations of aµs,i yield
the same limit, which then coincides with the average of minπ∈∆N Hη{π} over
aµs,i. The average of lnZ over the a’s, which we denote by 〈. . .〉a, is reduced to
that of moments of Z using the replica trick[16]:
〈lnZ〉a = limn→0
1
n
ln 〈Zn〉a (A.3)
With integer n the calculation of 〈Zn〉a amounts to study n replicas of the the
same system with the same realization of aµs,i. To do this we introduce a set
of dynamical variables πa ≡ {πs,i,a} for each replica, which are labeled by the
additional index a = 1, . . . , n. Each replica has its corresponding Hamiltonian,
which we write as Haη{πa} = A2a − ηNGa,a where Aµa =
∑
i∈N ~πi,a · ~ai and
NGa,a =
∑
i |πi,a|2 (the reason for this notation shall become clear later). The
set of all dynamical variables for all replicas is the direct product ∆N n of
n phase spaces ∆N . In order to compute the limit n → 0 in Eq. (A.3) one
appeals to analytic continuation of 〈Zn〉a for real n. We give here the details of
in strategies should be introduced so that “similar” histories (=information µ) lead
to similar forecasts. Even though it is not clear how to translate this requirement
mathematically (one way could be that followed in ref. [33]) it is clear that it suggests
that the number of relevant informations P is much less than NM .
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the calculation in our specific case. More details on the nature of the method
can be found in ref. [16]. We write
〈Zn〉=Trπ
n∏
a=1
∏
µ∈P
〈
e−β̺
µ[(Aµa)
2−ηNGa,a]
〉
a
=Trπ
∏
µ∈P
n∏
a=1
Ezµa
〈
e−i
√
2β̺µzµaA
µ
a
〉
a
eβηNGa,a (A.4)
where Ez[. . .] stands for the expectation over the Gaussian variable (unit vari-
ance an zero mean) z and we have introduced one such variable zµa for each a
and µ, using the identity Ez[e
−ixz] = e−x
2/2. In addition we used the shorthand
Trπ for the integral over ∆
N n. The average over aµs,i now factorizes
n∏
a=1
〈
e−i
√
2β̺µzµaA
µ
a
〉
a
=
∏
i∈N
S∏
s=1
〈
e−i
√
2β̺µ(
∑
a
zµaπ
a
s,i
)aµ
s,i
〉
a
=
and we can explicitly compute it using the distribution (2). This gives
=
∏
i∈N
S∏
s=1
cos
[√
2β̺µ
n∑
a=1
zµaπ
a
s,i
]
≃ ∏
i∈N
exp

−β̺µ n∑
a,b=1
zµa z
µ
b
∑
i∈N
~πai · ~πbi

 .
In the last passage we used the relation cosx ≃ e−x2/2 which is correct to order
x2 in a power expansion. This is justified as long as ̺µ → 0 as P = αN →∞
for each µ ∈ P. Note that, because of this reason, we would have got the
same result for any generic distribution Pi(a) of a
µ
s,i such that 〈a〉 = 0 and
〈a2〉 = 1. This allows us to understand why models with continuum strategies
aµs,i ∈ IR, such as the one proposed in ref. [27], yield the same results as the
one with binary strategies, which we are discussing here. Before going back
to Eq. (A.4), we introduce the matrices Gˆ ≡ {Ga,b, a, b = 1, . . . , n} and
rˆ ≡ {ra,b, a, b = 1, . . . , n} through the identities
1 =
∫
dGa,bδ
(
Ga,b − 1
N
∑
i∈N
~πai · ~πbi
)
∝
∫
dra,bdGa,be
αβ2ra,b
2
(
∑
i
~πai ·~πbi−NGa,b)
for all a ≥ b, where δ(x) is Dirac’s delta function and we used its integral repre-
sentation. The only part depending on the πas,i in 〈Zn〉 is eαβ
2
∑
a≥b
ra,b
∑
i
~πa
i
·~πb
i
/2
.
This can be factorized in the agent’s index i and so the integral Trπ on ∆
N n
can be factorized into N integrals over ∆n (=the direct product of the sim-
plexes of the n replicas of the same agent’s mixed strategies). With this we
can write
〈Zn〉 =
∫
dra,bdGa,be
−βnNFβ(Gˆ,rˆ) (A.5)
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where, specializing to the case ̺µ = 1/P 21 ,
Fβ(Gˆ, rˆ)=
α
2nβ
ln det
[
Iˆ +
2β
α
Gˆ
]
+
αβ
2n
∑
a,b
ra,bGa,b
− 1
nβ
lnTrπ∈∆n exp

αβ2
2
∑
a,b
ra,b~π
a~πb

− η∑
a
Ga,a, (A.6)
where Iˆ is the identity matrix. The first term arises from the expectation over
zµa . This factorizes for each µ and one is left with a Gaussian integral over
~z ∈ IRn. The second and the third terms arise from the integral representation
of the delta functions 22 .
The key point is that, in the limit N →∞ the integral over the matrices rˆ and
Gˆ in Eq. (A.5) are dominated by their saddle point value, i.e. by the values
of ra,b and Ga,b for which F attains its minimum value
23 . One should then
study the first order conditions ∂F/∂ra,b = 0 and ∂F/∂Ga,b = 0 for all a, b.
Here we focus on the replica symmetric approximation where we assume that
the matrices for which F attains its extreme have the form
Ga,b = g + (G− g)δa,b, ra,b = r + (R− r)δa,b. (A.7)
This ansatz is correct for η ≤ 0 and for η > 0 and α large enough[23]. The
reason for this is that Hη is a non-negative definite quadratic form in ∆
N .
Hence it has a very simple energy landscape, characterized by a single valley.
Taking the limit n→ 0, Eq. (A.3) then gives
F
(RS)
β (Q, q, R, r)=
αg
α + 2β(G− g) +
α
2β
ln
[
1 +
2β(G− g)
α
]
− ηG
+
αβ
2
(RG− rg)− 1
β
E~z{ln Trπ exp [−βV~z(~π)]} (A.8)
where Trπ is now the integral over the simplex ∆ of a single agent’s mixed
strategies and we defined, for convenience, the potential V~z(~π) =
√
αr ~z ·
~π − α
2
β(R − r)|π|2. The parameters g,G, r and R are fixed by the first order
conditions ∂F
(RS)
β /∂g = 0, ∂F
(RS)
β /∂G = 0, ∂F
(RS)
β /∂r = 0 and ∂F
(RS)
β /∂R =
21 A generic distribution ̺µ can also be handled, though with heavier notations.
22 For simplicity we have also done the transformation ra,b → ra,b/2 for a 6= b so
that
∑
a≥b →
∑
a,b.
23 Note that, by Eq. (A.2), we shall also be interested in the limit of β →∞ in the
end!
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0. These equations, finally, have to be studied in the limit β →∞, where one
recovers the minimum of Hη by Eq. (A.2), i.e.
lim
N→∞
min
π∈∆N
Hη{π}
N
= − lim
β→∞
1
βN
〈lnZ(β)〉 = lim
β→∞
F
(RS)
β (Q, q, R, r)
∣∣∣∣
sp
where the subscript sp means that we compute the function F
(RS)
β at the
saddle point values of Q, q, R and r.
It is convenient to define the parameters
χ =
2β(G− g)
α
, y =
√
g/α
1 + η(1 + χ)
(A.9)
In the limit β →∞, we first look for solutions where g → G and χ, which we
call susceptibility, remains finite. This implies that two replicas of the same
system converge in the long run to the same stationary state. Using the saddle
point equations, and g = G, we can rewrite
V~z(~π) =
2y ~z · ~π + π2
1 + χ
, β →∞ (A.10)
The last term in Eq. (A.8) is dominated by the mixed strategy ~π∗(~z) which is
the solution of
~π∗(~z) = argmin
π∈∆
V~z(~π). (A.11)
We find that G = g = E~z[~π
∗(~z)], which is then a function of y only G ≡ G(y).
Upon defining ζ(y) = E~z[~z · ~π∗(~z)], we find
χ(y) = − ζ(y)√
αG(y) + ζ(y)
The second of Eqs. (A.9) becomes an equation for y as a function of α which
has two implicit solutions. These can be expressed as explicit solutions for α
as a function of y and η:
α =
1
G

G− yζ ±
√
(G+ yζ)2 − 4ηyζG
2(1− η)y


2
(A.12)
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A.1 η ≤ 0
The solutions of Eq. (A.12), for η < 0 describe the two branches α < αc and
α > αc. In particular for η → 0− these solutions become
αy2 = G(y), αG(y) = ζ2(y). (A.13)
Let us discuss first the case η → 0−: The free energy per agent is
lim
N→∞
H
N
= − lim
N→∞
〈lnZ(β)〉a
N
=
G
(1 + χ)2
(A.14)
These equations are transcendental and we could not find an explicit solution
for generic S. Nevertheless, they represent a great simplification with respect
to the original problem. The main technical difficulty lies in the evaluation
of the functions G(y) = E~z[|π∗(~z)|2] and ζ(y) = E~z[~z · ~π∗(~z)], which can be
computed numerically to any desired accuracy ∀S.
The first of Eqs. (A.13) gives the α > αc phase. This solution has χ > 0
finite and H > 0 non-zero. As α decreases χ increases and it diverges as
|α− αc|−1 when α→ α+c . In this limit Eq. (A.14) implies that H ∼ |α− αc|2
vanishes. The critical point αc = α(yc) is obtained imposing χ = ∞, which
gives G(yc) = −ycζ(yc). By the numerical evaluation of the functions G(y)
and ζ(y), we find
αc(S) ∼= αc(2) + S − 2
2
(A.15)
to a high degree of accuracy. It might be that this equation is exact but we
could not prove it. An interesting relation for αc(S) can be derived by algebraic
considerations: Note that for each πs,i > 0 the equation
∂H
∂πs,i
= 2
∑
j,s′
as,ias′,jπs′,j = 0 (A.16)
must hold. This is a set of linear equations in the variables πs,i > 0. The NS×
NS matrix as,ias′,j is built with P dimensional vectors a
µ
s,i and therefore has at
most rank P . In other words there are only P independent equations (A.16).
In addition there are N normalization conditions on πs,i. The system becomes
dynamically degenerate when the number of free variables πs,i becomes bigger
than the number P +N of independent equations and, exactly at αc the two
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are equal. Dividing this condition by N gives the desired equation
S∑
s=1
E~z{θ[π∗s(~z)]} = αc(S) + 1. (A.17)
The left hand side is the average number of strategies used by agents (called
n in section 8). Note that this equation implies that αc(S) cannot grow faster
than linear in S. Also αc(S) ∝ S/2 imply that agents use on average 1/2 of
their strategies at αc.
The second of Eqs. (A.13) gives the α < αc phase. Note indeed that with this
choice χ ≃ −1/η →∞ and H ∼ η2 → 0 as η → 0−. At odds with the solution
for α > αc, this equation only arises if η < 0 and in the limit η → 0−. With
η = 0 the saddle point equations have only a solution with G > g in the limit
β → ∞. This is because for α < αc the set M where H = 0 is not a single
point, but rather a connected set. The replica method with η = 0 takes an
average on all the setM and so it gives results which are not representative of
a particular system 24 . In order to select a single point inM one may consider
the limit η → 0−. Since the term −η N G in Hη breaks the degeneracy of
equilibria for η = 0, the limit η → 0− selects the equilibrium which is closest
to the random initial condition πs,i(0) = 1/S for all i ∈ N and s = 1, . . . , S.
This describes the stationary state of a system of agents with no prior beliefs
(Us,i(t = 0) = 0, ∀s, i).
In both phases, once the saddle point equations are solved, one can derive
the full statistical characterization of the system. For instance the fraction of
agents playing a strategies in a neighborhood d~π of ~π is given by p(~π)d~π =
E~z[δ(~π
∗(~z)− ~π)]d~π.
A.2 η > 0
Let us for simplicity consider the simpler case S = 2. The solution with G = g
exists for α ≥ 1/π. For α > [π(1− η)2]−1 this solution has G = g < 1, which
means that agents do not all play pure strategies. When α → [π(1 − η)2]−1,
G→ 1 and the solution becomes independent of η. In other words, the solution
merges with the solution for η = 1. In its turn this solution breaks down,
with χ → ∞ and H1/N = σ2/N → 0 when α → 1/π. Below this point, only
solutions with G < g andH1/N = 0 exist. This behavior is well documented in
figure 4. However, for η > 0, one needs to go beyond the simple approximation
for Ga,b and ra,b in Eq. (A.7). Therefore we shall refrain from a more detailed
24 Note indeed that g has the interpretation of the overlap between two replicas of
the same system, so that g < G means that the two replicas are not identical.
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discussion and rather refer the interested reader to a forthcoming publication
[23].
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